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reluctance to allow federal "interference" with state regulation, the
underlying thought being that insurance is still basically a matter for
local regulation. Since Congress created uncertainties under the
act, Congress should remedy them.
WALLACE C. TYSER, JR.
Civil Procedure-Discovery of Liability Insurance
In the recent case of Cook v. Welty,1 the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia held that the plaintiff, in an
action brought to recover damages for personal injuries arising out
of an automobile accident, should be granted discovery by deposition or interrogatories of the existence and coverage of defendant's
liability insurance.'
Federal courts, and state courts that have procedural rules similar
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are almost evenly divided
on whether automobile liability insurance is discoverable. This problem is relevant in North Carolina because a new code of civil procedure has been proposed by the General Statutes Commission and3
will be considered by the 1967 North Carolina General Assembly.
Deposition and discovery under the Federal Rules are encompassed by Rules 26 to 37:4 Rule 26(b) delimits the scope of this
discovery.' It provides:
'253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966).
2Id. at 878.
* GENERAL STATUTES COMMISSION, PROPOSED NORTH CAROLINA RULES

OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1966), [hereinafter cited as PROPOSED RULES.] The
Proposed Rules are based on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
correspond numerically to rules of the Federal Rules.
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
'Whether discovery is by deposition (FED. R. Civ. P. 26, 30), interrogatories (FED. R. CIv. P. 33), or by production of documents and things
for inspection, copying, or photographing (FED. R. Civ. P. 34), Rule 26(b)
delimits the scope of examination both in the Federal Rules and the Proposed
Rules for North Carolina. FED. R. Civ. P. 33-34 provide:
[RULE 33] Interrogatories may relate to any matters which can be
inquired into under Rule 26(b)....
[RULE 34] the court . . . may . . . order any party to produce and
permit the inspection and copying . . . of any . . . docu-

ments . . . which constitute or contain evidence relating
to any of the matters within the scope of examination
permitted by Rule 26(b) ....
Welty involved a motion to compel defendant to respond to questions
asked while taking a deposition. It was stipulated by the parties that the
issue would also arise if interrogatories covering the same subject matter
had been served.
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(b) Scope of Examination. Unless otherwise ordered by the
court as provided by Rule 30(b) or (d), the deponent may be
examined regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action ....

It is

not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."
Almost all decisions, in determining whether liability insurance
is within the scope of Rule 26(b), turn on whether insurance is
'FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). PROPOSED RULE 26(b) is a copy of FEDERAL
RuLE 26(b) with the following addition:
nor is it ground for objection that the examining party has knowledge of the matters as to which testimony is sought. But the deponent
shall not be required to produce or submit for inspection any writing
obtained or prepared by the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor, or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for
trial unless the judge otherwise orders on the ground that a denial of
production or inspection will result in an injustice or undue hardship;
but, in no event shall the deponent be required to produce or submit
for inspection any part of a writing which reflects an attorney's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, or except
as provided in Rule 35, the conclusions of an expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b), (d), allow the court to limit or terminate discovery
in order to protect the parties and deponents. They provide:
(b). Orders for the Protectionof Partiesand Deponents. After notice

is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and
upon notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action
is pending may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or
that it may be taken only at some designated place other than that
stated in the notice, or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain matters shall not be inquired into, or that
the scope of examination shall be limited to certain matters, or that
the examination shall be held with no one present except the parties
to the action and their officers or counsel, or that after being sealed
the deposition shall be opened only by order of the court, or that
secret processes, developments, or research need not be disclosed, or
that the parties shall simultaneously file specified documents or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as directed by
the court; or the court may make any other order which justice requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
(d). Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination. At any time during

the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the deponent
and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad
faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or
oppress the deponent or party, the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district where the deposition is being taken
may order the officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith
from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of the
taking of the deposition as provided in subdivision (b).
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relevant to the subject matter.7 The courts that allow this discovery
use three basic approaches.
(1) Some simply state that insurance is relevant to the subject
matter.' They hold that the test of relevancy at discovery is not
whether the information sought is admissible in evidence or is
relevant to the precise issues in the case, but whether the information is relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.9 In
effect, these courts hold subject matter to include anything that wil
be helpful in preparing the case.' 0
However, this interpretation of relevancy does not seem valid in
light of the history of Rule 26(b). In 1946, it was amended to add:
"It is not ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."' 1 In the
Committee Note of 1946 to amended subdivision (b), it is stated:
The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the
names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party
in the preparation or presentation of his case. .

.

. In such a

preliminary inquiry admissibility at trial should not be the test as
to whether the information sought is within the scope of proper
examination. .

.

. Of course, matters entirely without bearing

either as direct evidence or as leads to evidence are not within
the scope of the inquiry ....1
Thus, the test of relevancy to the subject matter contemplates
discovery either to obtain evidence to be introduced at the trial, or
to secure information as to where such evidence may be found.
While liability insurance is admissible as evidence in certain situa'There are apparently no courts that consider whether insurance is
privileged. Historically, there are three types of privilege recognized as a

defense to discovery: privilege against self-incrimination, professional privi-

lege, and privilege against making disclosures which would be injurious to
the public interest. See Note, 34 NOTRE DiE LAw 78, 80 (1958). This
Note expresses the view that in this historical context, automobile liability

insurance is not privileged.

'See, e.g., Hurley v. Schmid, 37 F.R.D. 1 (D. Ore. 1965); Furumizo v.
United States, 33 F.R.D. 18 (D. Hawaii 1963); Johanek v. Aberle, 27
F.R.D. 272 (D. Mont. 1961); Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Mont. 1961); Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D.
Tenn. 1951); Orgel v. McCurdy, 8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
0Ibid.
10 See, Maddox v. Grauman, 265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
11

FED.

R. Civ. P. 26(b).

"' UNITED STATES SUPREmE CouRT,FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

65-6 (rev. ed. 1947).
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13

it generally can neither be admitted as evidence nor be men14
tioned in front of a jury.
Many courts hold that under the guidelines of the committee
note above, insurance is irrelevant and not discoverable. 5 Although
this conclusion seems valid, it is ignored by many courts. In Welty,
for example, after recognizing that as a matter of strict logic insurance is irrelevant, the court dismissed this as too narrow a view. 6
In the case of Orgel v. McCurdy,17 the court simply held that insurance may be generally relevant to the issues in the case.18 However,
it seems the valid test is whether it is relevant, not that perchance it
may be relevant. 9
(2) Other courts hold that insurance is relevant to the subject
matter because plaintiff has a discoverable interest in the policy. ° In

Maddox v. Grauman,2 ' the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held
that the standard liability policy evidences a contract that inures to
" See, e.g., Plyler v. Gordon, 25 F.R.D. 170 (D.N.J. 1960), where insurance could be used to show defendant was an independent contractor and
thus not covered by the workman's compensation law; Layton v. Cregan &
Mallory Co., 263 Mich. 30, 248 N.W. 539 (1933), where a liability policy
could be used to establish ownership of the vehicle; Modem Elec. Co. v.
Dennis, 259 N.C. 354, 130 S.E.2d 547 (1963); Isley v. Winfrey, 221 N.C.
33, 18 S.E.2d 702 (1942); Davis v. North Carolina Shipbuilding Co., 180
N.C. 74, 104 S.E. 82(1920).
" See, e.g., Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726 (1927);
Lylton v. Marion Mfg. Co., 157 N.C. 331, 72 S.E. 1055 (1911). While
upholding the general rule that liability insurance is inadmissible as evidence,
dicta in Welty states that perhaps the time has come to change this rule.
253 F. Supp. at 878-79. The rationale is that most states now have compulsory automobile insurance and most jurors will assume that defendant
has insurance.
" See, Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Cooper v.
Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D.
159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Langlois v. Allen, 30 F.R.D. 67 (D. Conn. 1962);
McDaniel v. Mayle, 30 F.R.D. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1962); Flynn v. Williams,
30 F.R.D. 66 (D. Conn. 1958); Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill.
1958); Roembke v. Wisdom, 22 F.R.D. 197 (S.D. Ill. 1958); McNelley v.
Perry, 18 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. Tenn. 1955); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952); Mecke v. Bahr, 177 Neb. 584, 129 N.W.2d 573 (1964).
16253 F. Supp. at 876-77.
8 F.R.D. 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
8
Id. at 586. While there is an indication that insurance was relevant
in Orget because there was a question of control of the vehicle, many cases
use Orget as authority where there is no issue of control. See, e.g., Brackett
v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951).
19 DiPietruntonio v. Superior Court, 84 Ariz. 291, 327 P.2d 746 (1958).
2
Hurt v. Cooper, 175 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Ky. 1959); Brackett v.
Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12 F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Pettie v.
Superior Court, 178 Cal. App. 2d 680, 3 Cal. Rptr. 267 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
21265 S.W.2d 939 (Ky. 1954).
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the benefit of every person who may be negligently injured by the
assured as completely as if such injured person had been named in
the policy. This is because if there is judgment against the defendant and he does not pay, then plaintiff can go against the insurance
company. The court concludes:
If the insurance question is relevant to the subject matter
after the plaintiff prevails, why is it not relevant while the action
pends? We believe it is. An insurance contract is no longer a
secret, private, confidential arrangement between the insurance
carrier and the individual but is an agreement that embraces those
or property may be injured by the negligent act of
whose person
22
the insured.

In Welty the court extends this argument. It says that where
liability insurance is present, the insurance carrier takes over the
defense of the action and furnishes counsel to the defendant as well
as investigating facilities. Thus, it concludes that insurance should
23
be discoverable so that plaintiff can know his real foe.
Those courts denying that there is a discoverable interest point
out that before plaintiff has any rights against an insurance company, he must first recover a judgment against defendant. Therefore, as no enforceable claim accrues against the insurer until
judgment against the insured becomes final, plaintiff has no rights
under the policy at the discovery stage.2 4
In Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hopkins,"5 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court held that plaintiff could examine the policies but
that the policy amounts should be left off. This result would seem to
answer the arguments of Maddox and Welty. A plaintiff would be
able to determine his real foe as well as the rights and obligations
of the insurer without reference to the amount of coverage provided."
(3) The third ground on which courts hold insurance relevant
and thus discoverable is that such revelation will lead to negotiations
"Id. at 942.
" 253 F. Supp. at 877.
" See, Cooper v. Stender, 30 F.R.D. 389 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Superior

Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 2d 749, 235 P.2d 833 (1951) (dissent).
See also, 2 WILLIsTON, CoNTRAcrs § 403 at 1091 (3d ed. 1959). The courts

holding that there is a discoverable interest seem to overlook the highly technical nature of a true third party beneficiary contract.
105 N.H. 231, 196 A.2d 66 (1963).
"Id.
at 234, 196 A.2d at 68.
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and settlement." Welty rests its decision predominantly on the need
for settlement. The court explains that dockets are crowded and
accidents on the increase. If a number of cases cannot be settled out
of court, there will be congestion and the number of courts will
have to be greatly increased. The court feels that information concerning liability insurance and its limits is conducive to fair negotiations. It states, for example, that in cases where injuries are great
and insurance coverage low, the plaintiff might well be led to accept
a smaller settlement than the extent of the injuries would otherwise
warrant.28 Other courts hold that the mandate of Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure29 requires a construction of Rule
26(b) that will lead to speedy determination of actions by way of
settlement.8 0
Many courts, however, deny that the interest in settlements
makes liability insurance relevant to the subject matter. They feel
that the fact that courts are congested has no bearing on the fundamental rights of a defendant to have his day in court.8 ' They also
assert that the opposite of the large injury-low insurance argument
is equally valid. If there is a small injury or plaintiff has a weak
case, his discovery that defendant has high insurance limits might
82
result in greater demands by the plaintiff.
In answer to the argument that, in light of Rule 1, Rule 26(b)
should encompass discovery of insurance, some argue that while
compromise may be a by-product of discovery, the true goal of discovery and the Federal Rules is adjudication of the merits."8
" See, Cook v. Welty, 253 F. Supp. 875 (D.D.C. 1966); Hill v. Greer,
30 F.R.D. 64 (D.N.J. 1961); Schwentner v. White, 199 F. Supp. 710 (D.
Mont. 1961); Miller v. Harpster, 392 P.2d 21 (Ala. 1964).
" 253 F. Supp. at 877.

" "These rules .

.

. shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and

inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
"0E.g., Ash v. Farwell, 37 F.R.D. 553 (D. Kan. 1965); Hill v. Greer,
30 F.R.D.
64 (D.N.J. 1961).
"1E.g., Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958).
2 See, Bisserier v. Manning, 207 F. Supp. 476 (D.N.J. 1962); Rosenberger v. Vallejo, 30 F.R.D. 352 (W.D. Pa. 1962), where the court also
advances a test that if liability is admitted and damages are high, defendant
should reveal his insurance. But if liability is hotly contested, he should not.
" See, Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363 (1966), where
Mr. justice Black states that "if rules of procedure work as they should in
an honest and fair judicial system, they not only permit, but should as
nearly possible guarantee that bona fide complaints be carried to an adjudication on the merits." Id. at 373. Contra, Hill v. Greer, 30 F.R.D. 64

(D.N.J. 1961).
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In addition to these arguments, a few courts have held that
relevation of defendant's insurance at discovery violates his fifth
amendment constitutional rights. 4 The argument is that insurance
is an asset of defendant and that if discovery is allowed, there is no
rational basis to deny discovery as to all of defendant's assets before
liability is established. 35 Thus, Hillman v. Penny,36 a Tennessee
federal case, expressed the fear that a groundless claim might become the vehicle for making full inquiry into all the confidential
affairs of any defendant involved in an automobile accident.3 7
The arguments for relevancy of insurance as illustrated by Welty
thus seem to be answered both by the purpose of discovery, i.e., to
get to the merits, and the limitations on discovery, i.e., to matters of
evidence or matters that may lead to evidence. Nevertheless, the
courts are almost evenly divided on this question. As a number of
courts seem to disregard the purpose and language of Rule 26(b),
an amendment or a definitive decision by the United States Supreme
Court would seem desirable in order to have uniformity throughout
the federal system. When the North Carolina General Assembly
considers Rule 26(b), it specifically should either include or exclude
liability insurance from discovery.
EUGENE W.

PURDOM

Civil Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private
Club Exemption
In United States v. Northwest La. Restaurant Club1 a threejudge federal court held that the acts and practices of the members
of defendant club constituted an unlawful deprivation of rights
secured to Negro citizens for the free and equal use and enjoyment
of public accommodations guaranteed by Title II of the Civil Rights
" Gallimore v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283, 287 (E.D. Ill.
1958). For a thorough

discussion of the constitutional problem see Note, 34 NoTRE DAME LAW.
78 (1958).
" See, Hillman v. Penny, 29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Gallimore
v. Dye, 21 F.R.D. 283 (E.D. Ill. 1958); McClure v. Boeger, 105 F. Supp.
612 (E.D. Pa. 1952). Contra, Brackett v. Woodall Food Prods., Inc., 12
F.R.D. 4 (E.D. Tenn. 1951), which holds that a liability policy is not an
asset but purchase protection for both compensatory and punitive damages.
29 F.R.D. 159 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
"lId.at 161.

'256 F. Supp. 151 (1966).

